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On Absences as Material for Intellectual
Historical Study
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt
Among the many things that disciplines do, two of the
more important are to both make knowledge possible and
make knowledge impossible. Such is what any combination
of subject matter and methodology does. It acts as a
designation of value-this stuff is a subject for legitimate
study/this is an appropriate method-and valuelessness-
this stuff is not a subject for legitimate study/this method is
inappropriate. Beyond the frontier of an accepted subject
matter/methodology in any discipline there is a big sign-
"Beware. Here be dragons and sea monsters, unicorns and
mermaids."
For historians, von Ranke's crucial statement of
historical objective, loosely translated as the search for "what
[essentially] happened,"' has the obvious, but seldom-
emphasized property that, if there is no evidence that
something happened, then history, properly so-called, must
remain mute. This implied negative makes some sense of the
"tree falls in a forest and no one hears" variety. Still, the
t UB Distinguished Professor and Floyd H. and Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar,
State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law. Parts of this Paper go
back to discussions with my now retired colleague Jan Lindgren from when we
were teaching torts and contracts separately together thirty-five years ago. Over
time Guyora, Fred, Errol, Phil, Bert, and Jim offered helpful comments, as did
participants in the Baldy Center's seminar series on Institutionalism in 2003-04.
A long letter from Mark Fenster came at a crucial time and so made a big
difference, as did a suggestion that he made for shortening the Piece. It was a
good thing that I agreed to write and speak on the intellectual history of legal
doctrine at the "seminar for adults" that has resulted in the papers in this
Symposium. It provided an occasion for me to turn what were unbaked ideas into
at least half-baked ones.
1. Leopold von Ranke, Preface: Histories of Romance and Germanic Peoples,
in THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY: FRoM VOLTAIRE TO THE PRESENT 54, 57 (Fritz Stern
ed., trans., 1956) ("wie es eigentlich gewesen").
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efforts of historians to get around such an implied negative
have always amazed me.2
There is, however, a regular downside to von Ranke's
stricture-the notable tendency to "find an archive," or in
intellectual history "find an author," and then figure out
what might be said about some topic from that archive or
author or both. I understand this downside. My Realism book
began with the fortuity of finding an interesting archive, and
not even the one I was looking for. And my current book-
length project began when a colleague got tired of my
regularly telling her that she misunderstood the history of
the Post-World War II American economy, and so she
challenged me to write my story up. The resulting project
began when I recognized that I had to read a great deal of
stuff in order to be sure I had my story about Buffalo straight.
The relevant books and materials are still the core of my
project over fifteen years later.
Still, the limits in our disciplinary norms, limits that I
fight all the time, make it difficult to talk about absences,
things that didn't happen. When historians do talk about
absences, the talk usually consists of so-called counter-
factual history, the exploration of "what ifs," either a species
of wishful thinking or an assertion that what actually
happened was for the best since what didn't happen would
have been far worse. In contrast, for intellectual historians,
there might be a substantive reason for paying attention to
absences. Examination of circumstances where something
rather obvious was overlooked, where the disciplinary
blinders of value and valuelessness seem to have been
effective, might help us understand a good deal about
disciplinary intellectual life.' I wish to examine a rather large
absence in legal scholarship for just such purpose.
2. If I remember correctly, the first such effort I encountered was in a book by
Thomas Haskell where he cleverly got around the absence of a crucial letter by
reverse engineering it from the reply. See THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE
OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 149-52 (1977).
3. Charles Barzun brought to my attention the following explanation about
the importance of absences, and from an unexpected source:
For if it should turn out that some of [an idea's] implications were not
recognized, this may become a highly important, though negative,
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"Everybody knows," as Leonard Cohen says,4 that the
slow adoption of code pleading, and so the demise of the writ
system, brought the restructuring of the corpus of Anglo-
American law into the now common categories of
contract/tort/property that dominates our legal world, a
regime whose roots in the world of writs can be teased out by
knowledgeable people. Somewhat less than everybody knows
that the "one civil action" provision of the Federal Rules had
a similar effect, more summary than causative, on the
equally ancient division between cases at law and those in
equity. Nobody (but old-in both senses-teachers of
Contracts and Sales) knows that in the late Seventies and
Eighties contract and tort, respectively seen as claims for
breach of warranty and claims based on strict liability, came
close to fusing as Grant Gilmore had ruefully predicted,'
before the distinction between economic damages and
damages from personal injury proved to be sufficient to avoid
such an outcome.6 How was it that the recognition of the
existence of one civil action failed to generate a single form of
claim for civil liability, and so the general category of civil
obligation?
The absence of academic discussion of such a possibility
is well worth noting, if only because one could have teased
historical fact. Negative facts are of much more significance for the
intellectual historian than is usually appreciated. The things that a
writer, given his premises, might be expected to say, but doesn't say-
the consequences which legitimately and fairly evidently follow from his
theses, but which he never sees, or persistently refuses to draw-these
may be even more noteworthy than the things he does say or the
consequences he does deduce. For they may throw light upon
peculiarities of his mind, especially upon his biases and the non-rational
elements in his thinking-may disclose to the historian specific points at
which intellectual processes have been checked, or diverted, or
perverted, by emotive factors. Negative facts of this kind are thus indicia
of positive but unexplicit or subconscious facts.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas,
2 J. HIST. IDEAS 257, 264-65 (1941).
4. LEONARD COHEN & SHARON ROBINSON, Everybody Knows, on I'M YOUR MAN
(Columbia Records 1988).
5. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
6. See Seely v. White Motor Co, 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965); Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
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such a law of civil obligation out of the available materials.
Seen from a certain altitude, my favorite way of seeing law,
it would have been rather easy. Consider the following.
Contemporary tort law a la Prosser7 is usually
conceptualized as a pleading consisting of the following
elements:
duty + breach of duty + cause + injury + damage = $
Hanging around outside this well-ordered parade come
several, largely self-contained little problems-strict
liability, products liability, proximate cause, assumption of
risk, contributory versus comparative negligence. In
contrast, contracts, thanks to Corbin,' is a lot messier, but
can still be conceptualized, as if by Williston,9 into a pleading
consisting of the following elements:
offer + acceptance + consideration + cause + breach + injury + damage = $
Again, hanging around the edge are several little problems-
promissory estoppel, mistake, impossibility, Hadley v.
Baxendale,0 parole evidence, statute of frauds, duress, and
illegality.
Set out in this fashion, the obvious overlaps between two
areas, injury and damage, are either trivial-everyone knows
injury is a formal, empty category-or superficial-tort
damages are expansive, but contract damages are limited
and arguably tied directly to the particular theory of
damages, expectancy, reliance, or restitution appropriate to
the breach. Thus, tort and contract could be seen as separate.
Yet, if one escapes from Corbin's reformulation of Williston
and looks not at what the law professors say, but at how the
litigation lawyers use tort and contract doctrine, a quite
different picture appears.
Starting first with torts, the central question for a
litigation lawyer is not where Prosser's formulation starts-
duty. Duty is assumed. Rather, it is breach of duty (and of
7. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
8. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1952).
9. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1924).
10. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 149.
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course damages/my fee) that makes the tort lawyer's nose
twitch. So, it is standard of care and the difficulty of proof of
its violation that is central to the practice of tort law. Is one
faced with negligence or some variety of strict liability? Is
proof easy or hard given the money at stake? In addition to
this bifurcated question there is but one other for the
litigation lawyer, and that one not often-cause in fact. Did
the defendant's action that violated the applicable standard
of care actually cause the injury complained of? What is left
beyond these questions, whether or not analytically or
procedurally a matter for the plaintiff or defendant, is a
collection of rocks that the defendant can throw at the
plaintiffs case. These rocks are of two kinds. First, "You did
it"-contributory negligence, assumption of risk and one
branch of proximate cause. And second, "Not me"-no duty
or the other branch of proximate cause.
All of contracts can fit into this mold as well. Here again,
the central question for a contract litigator is not where
Williston starts-formation." Formation-offer, acceptance,
and consideration-like duty, is assumed. Rather, it is the
question of the performance promised as against that
delivered (and of course damages/my fee) that is central to
the practice of contract law. This is what on the rarest of
occasions makes the contract lawyer's nose twitch. Dig
through the cases on questions of warranty and performance
and, on reflection, reasonableness pops up all over. These
questions are at bottom matters of breach of duty, which, it
should be noted, subsume, and are subsumed by, concerns
about construction/interpretation, also classic matters of
reasonableness. So, it is standard of care and the difficulty of
11. Fred Konefsky reminds me of Christopher Columbus Langdell's retreat,
seemingly in horror, from his experience in legal practice where trial lawyers told
stories designed to demonstrate the reasonableness of behavior and then argued,
based on legal principle, into a world where the rules of contracts were designed
to order, and so define, reasonableness. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF
MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C. C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906, at 42-83, 87-94
(2009). However, Langdell always spoke about having based his work on
principles, a tie to his past. See id. It is modestly ironic that what he seems to
have done by basing his rules on principle is only to hide the reasonableness, not
replace it, never having understood the deep tie between law based on principle
and the reasonableness of conduct.
2016]1 145
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proof of its violation that is central to litigation in contract
law, just as in torts.
Even the question of causation, which accountably, but
nevertheless weirdly, appears as a limitation on damages-
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, or at least its first branch,
occasionally appears, as in the practiced version of tort law.
Again, what is left of contracts doctrine is a pile of rocks that
the defendant can throw at the plaintiffs case. These parallel
those in torts only in part because here the basic defendant's
strategy is "Not me," covering all of formation law and third
party beneficiaries (a parallel to duty), the second branch of
Hadley v. Baxendale (a parallel to proximate cause), and
mistake/impossibility, even parole evidence. It is only in
duress and illegality that anything approximating "You did
it" will arise.
Thus, from my certain altitude there is not very much
difference between a tort claim and a contract claim. In tort,
an action that meets the appropriate standard of care causing
injury that can be compensated in damages yields money.
Whatever the law books say, "duty" is not part of the
plaintiffs case, but rather its absence is a defense, and for all
of the palaver about negligence versus strict liability,
standard of care boils down to reasonable under the
circumstances. In contracts, an action that does not meet the
terms of the contract causing injury that can be compensated
in damages yields money. Whatever the law books say,
offer/acceptance/consideration are not a part of the plaintiffs
case but rather their absence is a defense, and for all the
palaver about contract construction and performance, they
boil down to reasonable under the circumstances.
Seen in this way, aspects of traditional understanding in
both fields that have always seemed alike, but yet unrelated,
come clear. Reasonableness is central to both bodies of law,
though in traditional contracts doctrine, centered in
formation and damages, that concept seems out of place. But,
with standard of care at the center of discussion, the anomaly
is lessened, for reasonableness, which is at the heart of both
construction and performance, is likewise at the heart of
negligence. Once so identified, the common tie to
reasonableness makes it easier to see how both areas of law
are appeals to culturally bound understandings of
146 [Vol. 64
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appropriateness on the part of both the advocate and the
decision-maker.
Similarly, the sense that both fields, what I have dubbed
the rock-throwing defenses, are uncomfortable appendages to
the main trunk of doctrine, appendages that need somehow
to be better attached, is both confirmed and oddly made
irrelevant. These rocks don't fit with the main trunk of
doctrine because they are not meant to fit. They are simply
"No's" and there are basically only two ways one can say "No"
to a claim-point the finger back at the plaintiff or point it
somewhere else.
How far can one push this fundamental unity between
contract and tort is an interesting question, one that I wish
to explore first, by looking at the law of corporations, and
then, that of property. Corporations doctrine is a mess of
statute and common law. 2 No one would suggest that it has
a unified structure of pleading. The statutory formalities of
formation, the powers of shareholders, directors, and officers;
the mechanics of acting through voting; and the limits on
each are often quite detailed. In contrast, the great common
law duties of care in the exercise of one's office and loyalty to
the corporation (now possibly supplemented by that of candor
toward shareholders!) that have long bound officers and
directors float majestically outside the statutory edifice. The
common, lawyerly understanding of the field asserts that the
state corporation acts are enabling legislation that creates
boundaries within which economic actors may make
agreements. This understanding pushes the common law
duties to one side and emphasizes the notion that the job of
the corporate lawyer is that of producing a world of paper
that takes advantage of the possibilities created under this
enabling legislation.
Such a picture of corporate law makes perfect sense until
one notices that all of the statutory powers seem to have
inherent in them a silent qualification-but not too much,"
12. A classic rendering of this mess is ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
(1986). For a clearer understanding of what is going on in the doctrine, see DAVID
A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CORPORATION (2007).
13. In my Chicago childhood, when speaking about the limits on graft and
corruption, this principle was rendered as "up to the wrist, but not to the elbow."
2016] 147
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rendered in the more formal language of the law professor-
form versus substance. There seems to be an implicit limit to
the substantive harm that may be done to others through the
formal exercise of most statutory powers, whether the matter
is one of salary or dividends, voting rights or quorums. One
may not use the corporate form to bring about outrageous
results, though this is not the outrageousness of the tort's
reasonable person, but rather that of the reasonable man
(and I use that term intentionally-it is a male standard of
conduct) in the counting house, warehouse, or corporate
headquarters, but not in the back alley or on the Clapham
omnibus. This is the same standard that can be inferred from
the case law on the great common law duties. The statutory
rules and the common law duties are thus but different
species of the common law's expansive genus called
"reasonableness," embedded deeply cultural understandings
of reasonable or appropriate behavior seen at a time and
place by people of a given social class and caste.
Interestingly, one can even identify the equivalent of the
pile of rocks given to the defendant in torts and contracts
cases. The endless silliness about the business judgment
rule-conflict of interest, outside opinions, consideration of
alternatives-and about the derivative actions-demand,
refusal, independent committee-provides the classic basis
for the corporate defendant to say "No!" in a circumstance
where it is hard to point the finger elsewhere.
If the doctrine of corporations is seen in this way, the role
of writing-of statute and contract, certificate and by-laws-
and, to an even greater extent, of corporate counseling, takes
on a different complexion. The work of the corporate lawyer
is that of keeping the litigation lawyer's nose out of the
business of business. As part of getting the paper in order,
ritual incantations are used in the hope of keeping judicial
or, even worse, citizen second-guessing under the guise of
reasonableness away from the concerns of corporate actors as
much as possible, a possibility based on the hope that specific
risks can be allocated to individual actors, but more general
risks have to be left to questions of reasonableness.1 4 The
14. Phil Halpern regularly and correctly reiterates this point. Unfortunately
the ubiquity of the Material Adverse Change clause in all serious contracts
148 [Vol. 64
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rubric is one of privateness, of attempting to keep the State
out of commercial affairs, but the reality is one of keeping the
larger community's inchoate understanding of appropriate
behavior at bay.
Property law is no less chaotic than corporate law,
probably even more so, since the corporations course and so
corporations doctrine, is more integrated, less a series of
discrete topics, than the property course." That course is a
mess, for it is hard to tell what holds together nuisance,
adverse possession, easements, zoning, eminent domain,
estates in land, co-tenancies and landlord and tenant
problems, other than buckram.1 6 For present purposes,
however, the course can be split into three pieces.
First, nuisance, adverse possession, easements, and co-
tenancies are all quite directly about interpreting the
informal interactions of people in the light of a common
understanding of what this behavior means. The law of
zoning, on the other hand, seems at first blush to be a matter
of administrative procedure, backed as always by
constitutional notions of due process, the taking of property,
and the obligation to pay just compensation. Zoning practice,
however, tends to focus on common understandings of
appropriate behavior, that is, the interests of adjacent and
nearby landowners. Such concerns seem remarkably similar
to those relevant to the notion of when justifiable regulation
slides into an inappropriate taking, a deeply fact specific
undermines the lawyer's intentions for it clearly covers both party specific and
economy general risks.
15. There has been no truly comprehensive book on property since JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY
(1888) (six volumes, one each for all six semesters of the then required Property
course at the Harvard Law School.) What has happened to such an edifice is that
the subject has fissured into numerous topics, and so courses, including sales,
secured transactions, estates and trusts, zoning, real estate transactions, and
mortgages.
16. Property is the only topic I discuss in this Paper that I do not know from
teaching, but rather only from listening to colleagues and practicing lawyers. I
know nothing about conveyancing law or the law of mortgages because I have
never heard someone else talking about either topic. Thus, I have ignored both,
though I would be surprised whether including them would force me to change
my conclusions. I ignore eminent domain because I have it on good authority that
the "public use" doctrine, the root of the subject, has become an empty placeholder
for whatever the State wishes to do.
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matter of common understanding of appropriate behavior in
the context of market values. And the notion of what process
is due is nothing but a discussion of appropriate bureaucratic
behavior. Takings is little else, though admixed with market
driven understandings of what it might be profitable to do
with property.
Estates-in-land is another matter altogether, if for no
other reason than that it introduces the concept of time,
futurity, as central to law. Much of the law of future interests
can be reduced to "magic words." Say these words in your
instrument and a particular result will follow; use other
words and there will be no telling what will happen. Still, the
most dogged defender of the formalisms of estates will
concede that from time to time the courts "get it wrong." The
magic words are used and unfortunately the proper results
do not follow. I would argue that these wrong decisions could
be seen to be times when the "equities" press most strongly,
again a matter of appropriate behavior.
The law of landlord and tenant, historically a branch of
estates in land, seems to be settling somewhere in between
the area of estates proper and nuisance, adverse possession
and easements. Consumer leases seem to show some
movement towards relying on common understandings of
appropriate behavior, while commercial leases, because of
their length and the care with which they are often drafted,
seem to be closer to a magic words approach, though, given
the lack of agreed magic words, certain similarities to
questions of construction in contracts, and so to measures of
appropriate understanding, can be seen to operate. Once this
simplification is made, the role of the property lawyer in
practice becomes clearer. Those lawyers also attempt to use
the magic of words to keep the litigation lawyer's nose out of
the business of property owners, to keep the inchoate notions
of appropriate behavior alive in the community away from
the disposition of capital.
By thus simplifying these various, seemingly separate
hunks of the property course, one might suggest that the
central question in modern property law may not be the
identification of estates, but the reasonableness of any use or
disposition of property. Placing this understanding of
property with what seems correct about contracts, torts, and
150 [Vol. 64
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corporations, one might formulate a theory of civil liability
based, not on rules, but on reasonableness, a culturally
determinate, class and caste informed, understanding of
what behavior is appropriate, normal even, in a given
situation. Thus, the general form for pleading what might be
seen as a true action for the violation of a civil obligation
would be:
unreasonable action + cause + injury + damage = $
Under such a conception of civil liability, property law is like
corporate law is like contract law is like tort law. Why is such
an understanding absent from the writings of legal scholars?
Before returning to this, my initial question about
absences, it is important to notice that a somewhat similar
simplification of doctrine, again from my aerial viewpoint,
can be had in areas of public law. Consider civil procedure,
the course that most first year law students quickly learn to
hate. The first topic is constitutional-personal jurisdiction,
where the rule is that in order to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant that person, place, or thing must have "minimum
contacts" with the forum. The second is less freighted, though
not one twit clearer, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-motion to dismiss, where the rule is, in text
at least, that dismissal is appropriate in circumstances when
the plaintiff has "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted."" And the third is Rule 56-motion for
summary judgment, where the rule is that for such a motion
to be granted there must be no material issue of fact and the
moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."
All three topics drive law students crazy. Minimum
contacts is the easiest for them because seemingly it can be
turned into a counting game. When it becomes clear that
some contacts count more than others, students tend to take
more seriously the sign, "Abandon hope all ye who enter
here." Failure to state a claim is difficult because first
semester, first year students know no law and couldn't
identify the elements of a cause of action if their lives
17. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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depended on it. When they finally understand that, despite
the fact that the rule says that the facts pled are to be taken
as true, the plausibility of the pled facts seems to be of some
importance, they know that they have reached some deep
circle of Hell. So, by the time they get to summary judgment
and are asked to identify the elements of a claim and then
which, if any, of these elements is contested, they are
sufficiently dispirited that they usually miss the clue in the
word "material." All three rules suppress the notion of
reasonableness that hides under each.
For a modest contrast, consider administrative law,
another of the courses I have tried to help students learn. I
took the class from ("with" is inappropriate here) Kenneth
Culp Davisl 9 who devised a grand structure for
administrative law that was designed as an antidote to the
much narrower focus to the course championed by one-time
Buffalo Law School Professor and Dean, Louis L. Jaffe-
judicial review of administrative action.2 0 After trying to
teach administrative law, I came to see that Davis'
understanding of the course was much more sensible than
Jaffe's, but that the latter's obsession with judicial review
was more interesting. Indeed, judicial review has generated
mountains of scholarship plumbing the Chevron test2' and its
progeny. Why this topic is so central to Jaffe's view of
administrative law escapes me. Anyone who pays attention
to administration generally knows that far more important
is the lobbying that goes on both in legislatures when
regulatory legislation is being considered and in agencies and
legislatures when regulations are being written and
applied/enforced. Perhaps what my colleague David Engel
says about Alternative Dispute Resolution, "[1]aw is the
alternative dispute resolution mechanism," is also the case in
administrative law. Judicial review is the "alternate
administrative norm shaping mechanism."
When one looks at the literature on judicial review, two
topics get paired together: statutory intent and statutory
19. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958).
20. LoUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
21. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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construction. Both are enormously complex, full of the rules
and counter-rules some of which Llewellyn once attempted to
catalog.2 2 Yet, stepping back, it is hard not once again to see
reasonableness rear its simple-minded head. This is
especially so because the answer to any question about why
judicial review is so important is usually something about the
rule of law, another very vexed topic. After one digests with
the odd fact that it was Friedrich A. von Hayek who
attempted to stuff the protection of "property" into this
otherwise procedural protection, 23 and then spends enough
time in the rule of law literature, that literature is easily
summarized as requiring "reasonable administrative
regularity."
To summarize, it seems, to me at least, that we have not
just one civil action, but one civil claim that unites tort and
contract, crucial parts of corporations, and property. The
concept that underpins this claim also is central to both civil
procedure and administrative law. So, it is here that the
question of developing an historical understanding of an
absence begins to bite. Surely there ought to be some talk of
an Anglo-American law of "civil obligation."
Now I do not call attention to this absence because I am
so damn bright. I'm not. There are all sorts of scholars who
know more about torts, contracts, corporations, property,
civil procedure, and administrative law than I do. I just see
law differently, to steal from a bad restaurant commercial.
Reasonableness seems to be a central part of what is a
question of the local understanding of appropriate behavior,
maybe not as local as 106th Street rather than 116th Street,
but still more local than the United States. Why do
intellectuals, that is what most law professors claim to be,
hide the one thing that might bring some modest sense of
order, both within and across doctrinal fields, to what is
usually seen as a long train with cars that have funny names
painted on them?
22. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950).




I think that intellectual historians are the right people to
tackle this question, for I suspect that it is the law professor's
understanding of legal theory as normative, and so rule
obsessed, that bears much of the blame. If one understood
why legal theory is normative, not descriptive, then one
might be near to knowing why civil obligation, seen as an
inquiry into reasonable behavior, is not central to our
understanding of civil law. I would argue this way.
It is not precisely true that no legal intellectual has seen
the absence of a notion of civil obligation in Anglo-American
law. In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore predicted the
eventual fusion of contract and tort into a general theory of
civil obligation.2 4 He was wrong. But, returning to the history
of products liability law, one of his central bits of evidence, is
a good place to start an inquiry into this absence. Remember
what happened: a distinction between economic damages and
damages from personal injury, the former, based on breach
of warranty, anchored liability in contract, and the latter,
based on strict products liability, anchored liability in tort,
saved the day. The separateness of these two fields of law-
an area of free agreement and an area of socially imposed
obligation, whatever the reality of either freedom or social
imposition-was preserved.
Given how essentially identical were the questions asked
in both warranty and strict liability-did the product not
turn out to be what it was alleged to be and so cause injury
to someone-the differences in the answers given, differences
that are far deeper (or is it wider?) than the obvious
divergences exposed by the law of damages alone, suggests
that something else has to be going on. For instance, tort not
only offers greater damages, but also a wider notion of
responsibility. Such a wider notion is inconsistent with an
understanding that the productive individual is the motor of
success in the property based, capitalist economy. Broad
protection might be offered to the economically active person
because the ability to continue to put property or self at risk
in a world of contracting where few prisoners are taken, and
so damages are limited, is central to the individual's role in
economy.
24. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 87.
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The foregoing words might suggest the role ideology
could have in determining the answers given. However, I
wish to avoid the reflexive slippage into the "I" word, once
bandied about recklessly, for I do not think that such a
multifarious concept is needed to explain the absence I have
identified. In this country at least, there are multiple
overlapping, though neither nested nor exclusive, cultures
demarcated by variables such as age, class, ethnicity,
occupation, religious affiliation, and distance from varying
streams of media. Individuals may participate in several of
these cultures at the same time. Each can be described as a
set of practices that instantiate, and so follow more or less
from enacted and/or un-enacted understandings of
appropriate behavior on the part of participants in that
culture. "Behavior" is the key word, for here the behavior of
lawyers is suggestive.
What property lawyers seem to be doing in their written
exercises is just what corporate lawyers are attempting to do
in theirs, and I might add, contract drafters in theirs. All
three are just sub-species of the transactional lawyer that
dominates the contemporary large law firm. Such lawyers
endlessly disparage as wasteful the activities of the litigation
lawyers who make up the other part of such firms and who
repay the favor by disparaging the bad drafting of
transactional lawyers. The work of the transactional lawyer
is designed to avoid the disruptive possibilities that the
litigation lawyer brings. All transactional lawyers work in
the hope of keeping litigators unemployed, for it is the
litigation lawyer whose stock in trade is the question of the
reasonableness of conduct that is common across fields of
tort, contract, corporations, property, civil procedure, and
administrative law.
Understandings of reasonableness abroad in the land can
render insecure the desires of the capitalists whose
transactions are alleged to make an economy run. This is
why, if sued, capitalists want the litigation quickly resolved,
a want that explains the peculiar dynamic of big corporate
litigation-motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment,
denial, settlement. Thus, the most interesting future
interests or commercial lease cases are those where words do
not work their magic, just as the most interesting contracts
cases are where the written disclaimers don't work or the
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corporations cases where the merger agreement comes
undone. Such cases allow a modest peek at what a less
specialized community might see as inappropriate behavior,
effectively the world of the tort lawyer with whom I began
this now long excursus.
I doubt that it is incidental that, as indicated above, the
areas where the litigation lawyer's understanding of law and
the understandings of other participants most diverge are
areas where commerce/ownership is most deeply implicated.
The creative destruction of capitalism is not a pretty sight.
As Bert Westbrook has tried to explain in City of Gold,2 5 one
does not have to be a socialist to recognize that, while we may
have little choice but to live in our economy, that does not
mean that doing so is a comforting activity. The space
between choice and comfort is where ideology as justification,
as explanation of the naturalness of an unpleasant set of
circumstances, might help soothe the way, at least for
citizens confronted daily with that unavoidable, but
unpleasant, reality. It is one thing to feel qualms about the
society in which one lives and quite another to look at that
society with a jaundiced eye. The panoply of doctrine that is
the law professor's daily grist may be easier to live with than
the daily reminder that the values of our commercial society
are in some sense unappealing, such as might come from
having to face the repetitive explication of "unreasonable
action" as the centerpiece of one's teaching, writing, or
practice life. An emphasis on law reform, the modest
improvement of small pieces of law that can be argued to be
somehow "wrong," that is at the center of legal scholarship
and bar association activity, may embody a similar
animation.
Here the opacity of the teaching of the rules of civil
procedure, based as it is on the verbal understandings of the
drafters and the practicing bar as well, adds weight to the
ideological argument. That the litigation lawyers, the
purveyors of reasonableness who emphasize the importance
of telling a good story, a classic measure of the situatedness
of the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, attempt to hide
25. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2004).
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reasonableness in their own book of rules with the thin tissue
of the distinction between questions of law and those of fact
is nothing short of astonishing.2 6 These rules, directed as they
are at both judges and other attorneys, are a monument to
wishful thinking of the "do what I say, but not what I do"
variety. But, such thinking makes perfect sense if one's worry
is that a less specialized community might see as
inappropriate behavior what good lawyers do every day in
the course of litigation.
Another aspect of the denial of the ubiquity of
reasonableness, of tort, that would be made obvious were
there a single action for redress of civil obligation, is the
bourgeoisie's nightmares that fuel the rule of law. The
protection of property at the heart of all dynastic novels is
also at the heart of all commercial life and the lives of all of
us in a society that values, indeed is founded on, commercial
life. Not surprisingly, the fear that the State, or someone else
using the apparatus of the State, will take away that which
has been wrestled as one's portion of the social wealth is at
the center of all bourgeois life, regardless of the nominal
social class of individuals in such a society. Consequently, the
notion of the rule of the law (and not of The Prince or the
State or the community at large) is, along with locks and
fences, cops and life insurance, one of the ways of stilling that
fear. A highly articulated system of rules, however dubiously
efficacious, is more comforting, more damping of the fear of
things that go, not "bump," but "what was yours is now mine"
in the night, than staring in the face a rule system that goes
straight to "unreasonable action" and its companion
understanding of the legal process-"reasonable regularity."
After all, it is property that pays for the institution that is
law.
As noted above, to speak of the fear of possible action that
might be taken by some governmental body to wrestle away
ones wealth is to talk of administrative law. The endless fear
of administrative arbitrariness on the part of business
interests is one of the great wonders of American life. It is
26. For my money, the best example of this activity is the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, a code of such complexity that it requires a full semester
course to master it well enough, not to practice, but to pass the New York Bar
Exam, though only after having taken a bar review course too.
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ironic in the extreme that a group which regularly hires
lawyers to negotiate reasonable legislation, then, if the
legislation is not to their liking, use the same lawyers to
negotiate reasonable regulations, and only later uses some
other lawyers to negotiate reasonable results in individual
instances of administrative enforcement of the rules, can still
be afraid of arbitrary action on the part of administrators and
so seriously argue that such action would undermine the rule
of law, when all of the group's previous actions have been
directed toward avoiding the effect of any possible rule. And
yet it is real. It is the language of judicial review. If this
language were otherwise taught or spoken, if it were phrased
in terms of reasonable administrative regularity, it would
protect neither the administrators nor the administratees
from what the more general community might see as less
than appropriate behavior.
So, where are we then with the exploration of possible
reasons for the absence of a recognition of a unified law of
civil obligation? A good argument can be made that the late
nineteenth century crystallization of two bodies of law, tort
and contract, even as reconstructed in the aftermath of Legal
Realism, obscures, intentionally perhaps, a fundamental
unity at the levels of both concept and practice. That
argument can be extended into fields such as corporations,
property, civil procedure, and administrative law. Yet the
proposition that law is centered, not on all of its exponentially
expanding base of rules, but on the redress of damage from
behavior seen to be unreasonable in a culturally determinate,
class and caste informed, understanding of appropriate and
normal in a given situation, is seemingly unthinkable by
legal intellectuals who are part of the disciplinarily focused
life that is the study of law.
This absence screams "Pay attention!" That this scream
goes unheard should not, however, be taken to be an example
of La Trahison des Clercs,27 or of des Avocates, but rather as
a recognition that law's job is not clarity of understanding,
much less normative perfection. Law gets modest jobs done,
hopefully done well, in a world that hardly is, and probably
never will be, representative of humans' highest aspirations




for the common good. It is a world not just of callous economic
destruction, but also of human cussedness. For workers in
that world to meet the standard of "hopefully well done" they
need the sense that there are boundaries to their tasks, that
they need not face "the cosmic good" alone. For this reason,
lawyers strongly identify with their field of specialization and
its "own" set of rules. Not surprisingly, they see their
specialty as giving them honor, and so status, within the
profession. Seen this way, my story about this absence is thus
not one about duplicity, much less "false consciousness." It is
a story about how otherwise life could not be comfortably
lived. Or maybe not.28 But, at the least, these or some other
set of reasons offered to explain this absence might help us
better understand what we mean when we tell tales about
the intellectual history of law.
28. Mark Fenster, for example, sees the private law subjects as unified by the
protection and distribution of property. I could easily agree, but would note that
reasonableness also raises its ugly head under this understanding.
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